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Editorial
What Level of Analysis is Most Salient for a
Global Theory of Corporate Governance?
By William Q. Judge

W

e have ﬁve rigorous and relevant new comparative
corporate governance studies in this issue. Each of
these studies contributes to our journal’s overarching
mission of moving toward a rigorous and relevant theory of
corporate governance that can be meaningfully applied
throughout the world. In this editorial, I would like to focus
on the multiple levels of analysis involved with arriving at a
global theory.
As discussed in my previous editorial, the primary focus
of all corporate governance research is at the ﬁrm-level of
analysis. However, the antecedents and effects of corporate
governance operate at multiple levels of analysis. I will illustrate this assertion in my following discussion of the ﬁve
articles published in this general issue.
In our lead article, Liu and Magnan examine the joint
effect of national self-dealing regulations and the ﬁrm’s
ownership structure to predict ﬁrm value in 22 nations from
Asia and Western Europe. Building on agency theory, they
ﬁnd that there is an interaction effect between national regulations and the “ownership wedge” across these governance
environments. Their study reﬁnes and extends LaPorta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) study which
demonstrated a rather general impact of national regulations
on ﬁrm value. Speciﬁcally, this study demonstrates both a
national-level and ﬁrm-level impact on ﬁrm valuation.
In our second article, Grosvold and Brammer seek to
explore how national institutions may inﬂuence the proportion of women on corporate boards within a nation. In their
comprehensive analysis of boards of directors operating in
38 nations from 2001–07, they reveal that national institutions were systematically related to gender diversity. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that cultural and legal institutions are
the predominant institutional drivers. While they did not
explore ﬁrm- or industry-level antecedents, they did ﬁnd
that national-level antecedents explained 40 to 60 per cent of
the variance in the proportion of women on corporate
boards.
Our third article is another multi-country study authored
by Du, Deloof and Jorrisen. This pioneering study ﬁlls a
rather large void in the international business and corporate
corg_841
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governance literatures by seeking to understand why some
boards for foreign subsidiaries are active, while others are
not. In this study, board involvement at the subsidiary level
was operationalized as the board being more active than
what the law requires in Belgium. Speciﬁcally, they studied
multi-national ﬁrms headquartered in 14 different nations
which operated foreign subsidiaries in Belgium. They found
that ﬁrm-level predictors, such the subsidiary’s strategic
mandate, prior performance, and size relative to the parent
ﬁrm to all be systematically related to subsidiary board
involvement. In addition, they found that the individual
CEO’s role back at headquarters, the cultural distance
between the two national cultures, and the overall national
governance system all inﬂuenced subsidiary board involvement. This study has implications for both agency and
resource dependency perspectives on corporate governance.
Arora and Dharwadkar were the authors of our next
article. This empirical study seeks to better understand how
corporate governance is related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) outcomes. In terms of CSR outcomes, they distinguish between “positive” CSR (i.e., proactive stakeholder
management) and “negative” CSR (e.g., violation of societal
standards and regulations). They examine larger ﬁrms in the
United States during the period of 2001–05, and they employ
the behavioral theory of the ﬁrm (BTOF) to understand the
moderators of the corporate governance-corporate social
responsibility relationship. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that
“effective” corporate governance constrains positive CSR
and it also reduces negative CSR. Furthermore, they also
note that ﬁrm slack and goal attainment discrepancies moderate this relationship, as the BTOF predicts. Therefore, this
study reveals the unique role of ﬁrm-level antecedents to
inﬂuence socially-important outcomes within a single
nation.
Our ﬁnal study by Lin, Yeh, and Li addresses the inabilities of existing theories to predict the evolution of corporate
governance in rapidly changing industrial environments,
and proposes a contingency approach to ﬁll the gap. Using
Taiwan’s high-technology industries as case studies, the
authors provide insights on how corporate governance
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changes among inter-organizational governance modes
depending on three contingency factors: technological
dependencies, capital availability and relative ﬁrm performance. As such, this industry-level study focuses on the
stage of the product life cycle to make predictions on the
most efﬁcient corporate governance mode within the value
chain for high-technology inter-organizational relationships.
While we still have much to learn before a global theory of
corporate governance emerges, this issue brings this
endeavor into sharper focus. First, these articles suggest that
there should be multiple levels of analysis in the global
theory and two of the levels should involve both nationallevel factors as well as ﬁrm-level factors. It is still premature
to know whether industry-level factors should be explored
further, as Lin and associates suggest, but it is worth exploring further. Second, universal theories, such as agency
theory, fail to consider national and industry context sufﬁciently. Similarly, only considering national-level context, as
many institutional researchers do, is insufﬁcient given substantial ﬁrm heterogeneity within a national context. Finally,
we need to learn much more about how governance bundles
(Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel & Jackson, 2008; Ward, Brown
& Rodriguez, 2009) work at multiple levels of analysis. For
example, do national-, industry- and ﬁrm-level governance
mechanisms complement or substitute for each other?
Of course, multiple levels of analysis may eventually show
that one level of analysis for the antecedents of corporate
governance is most parsimonious. As such, there is no
formal requirement that all levels be included in our global
theory. Furthermore, the ﬁeld may settle on the ultimate
effect of corporate governance to be only at the ﬁrmor national-level. However, my reading of the literature
suggests that multiple-level “meso” studies of corporate
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governance will prove to be most inﬂuential in future
research. Notably, other thoughtful researchers are coming
to the same conclusion (e.g., Brickson, 2005; Pitelis & Vasilaros, 2010; Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009). Please consider
submitting your research to our journal if you want to
engage in this simulating “conversation” on the antecedents
and effects of corporate governance throughout the global
economy.

REFERENCES
Aguilera, R., Filatotchev, I., Gospel, H., & Jackson, G. 2008. An
organizational approach to comparative corporate governance:
Costs, contingencies, and complementarities. Organization
Science, 19: 475–492.
Brickson, S. 2005. Organizational identify orientation: Forging a
link between organizational identify and organizations’ relations
with stakeholders. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50: 576–
596.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 2002.
Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance,
57(3): 1147–1170.
Pitelis, C. & Vasilaros, V. 2010. The determinants of value and
wealth creation at the ﬁrm, industry, and national levels: A conceptual framework and evidence. Contributions to Political
Economy, 29: 33–53.
Terjesen, S., Sealy, R., & singh, V. 2009. Women directors on corporate boards: A review and research agenda. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 320–340.
Ward, A., Brown, L., & Rodriguez, D. 2009. Governance bundles,
ﬁrm performance, and the substitutability and complementarity
of governance mechanisms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 646–660.

© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

